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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This Paper is part of a broader project examining the ways in which Amartya Sen’s 
“capability approach” provides a framework for thinking about global poverty as a denial or 
a violation of basic human rights. The Paper compares the “capability approach” as a basis 
for thinking about global poverty and human rights with the alternative framework 
developed by Thomas Pogge. Both the “capability approach” and Pogge’s theory of “severe 
poverty as a violation of negative duties” support the idea of “freedom from severe poverty 
as a basic human right”. However, there are important differences. The Paper examines the 
limitations of Pogge’s “apparent minimalism” and establishes the ways in which Sen’s 
treatment of the “capability approach” and human rights moves beyond a “minimalist 
normative position” whilst avoiding Pogge’s charge of “implausibility”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1The author is grateful for comments received on an earlier draft of this paper presented at 
the Fifth Conference on the Capability approach, Versailles, September 2005.  
Pogge -vs- Sen on Global Poverty and Human Rights 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 3 (2), 2006,  
http://ethique-economique.org/ 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This Paper compares Sen’s “capability framework” as a basis for thinking about global 
poverty and human rights with Pogge’s theory of “severe poverty as a violation of negative 
duties”. It examines the nature of Pogge’s “minimalism” and rejects the view that Pogge’s 
“Implausibility Thesis” poses a fundamental challenge to Sen’s treatment of the “capability 
approach” and human rights.  
 
Global poverty, human rights and Pogge’s “Implausibility Thesis”  
 
In a series of interventions in theoretical debates about global poverty and human rights, 
Pogge has defended a theory of “severe poverty as a violation of negative duties”. The 
clarificatory remarks in Pogge (2005: 67) suggest that acceptance of the “Minimalist 
Working Assumption” that human rights correlate with fundamental negative duties entails 
neither a rejection, nor an acceptance, of the proposition that human rights correlate with 
fundamental positive duties - but rather makes no further assumptions on this issue. 
Nevertheless, Pogge has repeatedly called into question the positive conceptions of “freedom 
from severe poverty as a basic human right” based on the general obligations of those “in a 
position to help”. He contends that conceptions of this type are often “implausible” because 
they are associated with “open-ended” duties of assistance and aid (e.g. 2004, 7-8). An 
important objective of this current Paper is to examine whether Sen’s treatment of the 
“capability approach” and human rights falls foul of this “Implausibility Thesis” 
(subsequently referred to as Pogge’s “First Implausibility Thesis”, or “PIT-1”).  
 
The link with Pogge’s more general critique of the “capability approach” 
 
The issues raised in the current Paper are also relevant to Pogge’s (2002b) critique of the 
“capability approach” as a theory of social justice. This suggests that a “plausible” and 
“widely shared” criterion of social justice is unlikely to compensate for the effects of 
personal heterogeneities and environmental / contextual variables per se (rather than for the 
effects of personal heterogeneities and environmental / contextual variables that are 
attributable to past and current inequalities in access to resources). In aiming to achieve 
equality in the “space” of capabilities and functionings (rather than in the “space” of 
resources), the “capability approach” gives rise to “open-ended” duties, and is 
“overextended” and “implausible” (subsequently, Pogge’s “Second Implausibility Thesis”, 
or PIT-2)2. Whilst focussing on the subject of global poverty and human rights, the Paper has 
more general relevance for the assessment of PIT-2.   
                                            
2Pogge (2002b) recognises that there might be other reasons than justice (e.g. duties arising 
from charity and  / or solidarity) to support compensations for capability-based rather than 
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1. GLOBAL POVERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE “CAPABILITY APPROACH”  
  
The ways in which the “capability approach” provides the basis for the elucidation of a sub-
class of human rights that focuses directly on the valuable things that people can do and be - 
including the capability to be adequately nourished (unaffected by endemic hunger and 
starvation), to enjoy adequate living conditions (with access to adequate shelter, housing and 
sanitation), to lead normal spans of life (unaffected by premature mortality or “excess” 
morbidity) and to read and write (unconstrained by illiteracy and inadequate educational 
provision - has been an important theme in recent work by Sen (e.g. 1982ab, 1984, 1999, 
2000, 2004, 2005) and others3. Vizard (2005, forthcoming) suggests that Sen’s treatment of 
this idea has moved international debates about global poverty and human rights forward in 
four key ways.  
 
1.1 Elucidation of a sub-class of “capability-rights”   
 
First, in moving beyond the Rawlsian position, Sen has argued that individual substantive 
freedoms in the form of the valuable beings and doings that people can and do achieve can 
be incorporated into ethical evaluation and included among the constituent elements of 
human freedom without loosing objectivity. This central argument provides the basis for the 
development of a theoretical framework in which basic capabilities are viewed as the objects 
of basic human rights that governments have obligations to respect, defend and support. For 
example, Sen has argued that if a person (x) has reasons to value a life without hunger and 
would choose such a life, then the capability of this person to achieve adequate nutrition is 
directly relevant to his or her real opportunity to promote her objectives and is expansive of 
her freedom. Conversely, deprivation in the capability to achieve adequate nutrition restricts 
                                                                                                                           
resource-based inequalities. However, he develops three arguments to support the thesis that 
resources rather than capabilities should be the focal variable of a theory of social justice.    
(1) As a metric used as a part of a public criterion of social justice, for the comparative 
evaluation of individual advantage, the “resourcist” metric can in principle take account of 
differences attributable to the effects of personal heterogeneities (e.g. disability) and to the 
effects of contextual variables (natural disasters, climatic variables etc).  
(2) As a criterion of social justice, “resourcism” “has every reason” to take account of 
personal heterogeneities caused by past inequalities in access to resources, and to 
compensate for the effects of past wrong-doing, as well as ensuring that the current 
institutional order neither produces nor reinforces such inequalities.  
(3) Resourcism can also take account of the ways in which social rules exacerbate the 
effects of adverse contextual variables (e.g. the ways in which adverse environmental events 
might be exacerbated by social rules that result in population groups living in mud huts).  
3This Essay focuses on Sen’s work. Other key contributions in this area include Nussbaum 
(1997, 1999abc, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2005).  
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x’s real opportunity to promote her objectives and is admissible as a “freedom restricting” 
condition. The valuation of “capability-freedoms” is associated in Sen’s conceptual 
framework with derivate classes of “capability-rights” and corresponding obligations - with 
the valuation of basic and central states of being or doing linked to claims on others to 
respect the “capability freedom” (through negative acts of omission and non-interference) 
and to defend and support the “capability freedom” (through positive acts of assistance and 
aid). In this way: “Minimal demands of well-being (in the form of basic functionings, e.g. 
not to be hungry), and of well-being freedom (in the form of minimal capabilities, e.g. 
having the means of avoiding hunger)” can be conceptualised as rights that “command 
attention and call for support” (Sen 1982a 4-7/15-19; 1985a, 217; 1985b, 21-24; 1992a, 66-
8; 1993a; 1999a,13-35/54-86)4. 
 
1.2 Departure from logical models that view all admissible human rights 
as co-possible and realizable 
 
Second, Sen relaxes certain logical conditions that libertarian models impose on the 
admissibility of human rights based claims. For example, Nozick (1974, 28-30) focuses on a 
narrow class of fundamental freedoms and human rights that are in logical terms “mutually 
co-possible”. This approach is intended to give rise to a “frictionless” model of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights that rules out all conflicts and incompatibilities - with a class of 
“universal negative rights” (characterised in terms of a set of “universal negative 
obligations” of omission and restraint) being viewed as logically co-possible (and therefore 
“admissible”), but “universal positive rights” (characterised in terms of “universal positive 
obligations” of assistance and aid) being viewed as not logically co-possible (and therefore 
ruled out by the model). In contrast, the “capability approach” relaxes the requirement of 
logical co-possibility and allows for the possibility of fundamental freedoms and human 
rights that are limited by resources and other cost and feasibility constraints - with Sen 
suggesting that fundamental freedoms and human rights can be coherent and meaningful 
even when the immediate and complete realization of a human right is not possible. For 
example, the positive obligations associated with “capability-freedoms” and “capability-
rights” may not relate directly to valuable states of being and doing (x) (that may be 
currently unachievable), but to policies and programmes p(x) that promote the achievement 
of (x) as an immediate or cumulative outcome - with violations involving the absence and 
inadequacy of policies and programmes p(x) (rather than the non-fulfilment of (x) per se) 
(Sen, 1982d; 2000a).  
 
                                            
4 For a different emphasis on the interpretation of Sen’s position here, see Osmani (2005: 
215-216), who argues that it is only when the causes of poverty directly relate to command 
over resources that ‘capability failure’ can be characterised as a denial of human rights. 
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1.3 Emphasis on “consequence-sensitive” ethical frameworks and on the 
development of systems of “goal-rights” 
 
Third, Sen has argued that the greatest scope for establishing general positive obligations to 
relieve poverty, hunger and starvation may arise in rights-based ethical systems that are 
“consequentialist but not welfarist” (1982b, 358). If rights are purely instrumental (e.g. as in 
the utilitarian-based forms of consequentialism) then there is no case for including the 
realization of rights in the specification of the fundamental objectives of a system; whilst if 
rights are viewed as fundamental, but are characterised in terms of negative constraints (as in 
the libertarian framework) then individuals are not required to promote human rights-
fulfilments through positive acts of assistance and aid. In contrast, Sen has advocated the 
development of “consequence-sensitive” ethical frameworks, with the fulfilment of human 
rights being included among the fundamental objectives of a goal-based ethical system, and 
the value of human rights fulfilments (and the disvalue of non-fulfilments) being taken into 
account in the evaluation of states of affairs. Sen’s defence of this position has addressed a 
number of the traditional concerns regarding consequential ethical systems and intrinsic 
valuation (including those relating to the accommodation of agent relative values and deontic 
concerns such as special ties and integrity) through the development of “evaluator relative 
outcome functions”. He concludes that the development of “consequence-sensitive” 
frameworks can provide a far-reaching basis for linking moral obligations to the goal of 
human rights fulfilments through “consequence-sensitive” links” and for elucidating the 
general obligations of third parties “in a position to help” (1987b: 56-57,70-78; 1982a: 3-20, 
38-39; 1985a: 217; 1985b: 14-19).  
 
1.4 Extension of theories of human rights to the domain of “imperfect 
obligation” 
 
Fourth, Sen’s treatment of the “general obligations of those in a position to help” emphasises 
the validity of the extension of theories of human rights into the domain of “imperfect 
obligation”. His position here represents an important departure not only from the libertarian 
but also from theories in the liberal tradition that make analytical space for the concept of 
positive obligation - but that maintain that, in the context of income poverty and other forms 
of basic deprivation and impoverishment such as hunger and starvation, ill-health and 
illiteracy, positive obligations are not associated with counter-party human rights. For 
example, O’Neill (1986, 1993, 1996) departs from the libertarian position and defends the 
admissibility of a general class of “universal positive obligations” - including far-reaching 
“universal positive obligations” to relieve income poverty and other forms of basic 
deprivation and impoverishment. However, she limits the reach of a theory of fundamental 
or human rights to the domain of “universal perfect obligation”, and disputes the idea that 
“universal positive obligations” to relive poverty, hunger and starvation are associated with 
counter-party human rights that are coherent, meaningful and enforceable. In contrast, Sen 
has argued that the valuation of human rights in “consequence-sensitive” ethical systems is 
not contingent on the precise specification of rights-obligations links, or on codification in 
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positive law; and the development of “consequence-sensitive” ethical systems provides a 
basis for linking human rights to “imperfect obligation” as well as to “perfect obligation” 
(1982a, 2000). He has argued that rights can relate to goal-promotions rather than to the 
achievement of particular actions (giving rise to the general sub-class of “goal-rights”) 
(1982a, 3 8; 1982b, 347; 1985b, 2002a, 645) and that “imperfect obligations” are associated 
with a requirement of “reasonable action” - allowing for “permitted limitations” when goal-
fulfilments are not mutually compatible (2004: 10; c. r. section 4). 
 
2. POGGE ON “SEVERE POVERTY AS A VIOLATION OF NEGATIVE DUTIES”  
 
Pogge’s (2002a, 2004) sets out a theory of global poverty and human rights that emphasises 
the ways in which it is possible to establish severe poverty as a human rights violation under 
a “minimalist normative position” which assumes that justice and human rights involve only 
“specific minimal constraints - more minimal in the case of human rights - on what harms 
persons may inflict upon others” (2002a: 13). The underlying rationale is to develop a theory 
of severe poverty as a violation of human rights on the basis of the assumption that human 
rights impose not a fundamental positive duty to assist and aid the poor, but rather a 
fundamental negative duty which imposes a constraint on conduct that causes harm5. Pogge 
views a fundamental negative duty of this type as imposing a constraint on conduct that 
causes severe poverty, and an associated restriction on the imposition of institutions that 
cause severe poverty. He contends that, by adopting this approach, it is possible to 
characterise human rights based claims arising from severe poverty in terms of rectification 
for harm done by past and present conduct (rather than in terms of fundamental positive 
duties of assistance and aid), and to arrive at a characterisation of “severe poverty as a 
violation of human rights” on the basis of a “minimalist normative assumption” that is likely 
to attract widespread support.  
 
2.1 Establishing severe poverty as a human rights violation under a 
“minimalist normative assumption”    
 
The central aim in Pogge (2002a, 2004) is to establish severe poverty as a human rights 
violation under the “Minimalist Working Assumption” given in Box 1. Under this 
“Minimalist Working Assumption”, the establishment of human rights based claims is 
critically dependent on the attribution of causal responsibility. However, Pogge contends that 
it is possible to go significantly beyond the libertarian position on human rights without 
denying its central tenet (that human rights entail only negative obligations) by establishing 
that social institutions have a causal role in generating insecure access to the objects of 
human rights. Given (1) the proposition that institutions have a causal role in the generation 
                                            
5Pogge adopts the following terminological distinctions: (1) duties are morally fundamental; 
(2) some duties are generative duties - that is, duties that, in conjunction with appropriate 
empirical circumstances, create more specific moral reasons of action: obligations (2005: 
68).  
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and persistence of poverty and (2) the proposition that individuals have responsibility (albeit 
collectively) for the creation and perpetuation of such institutions, he maintains that 
fundamental freedoms and human rights can be viewed as giving rise to negative obligations 
of individuals and collective agents to refrain from supporting such institutions. Failure to 
respect negative obligations is viewed not in terms of the failure to assist and aid those who 
are in desperate need, but in terms of causal responsibility for the generation and persistence 
of poverty.  
 
2.2 The distinction between the active causation of severe poverty and the 
failure to alleviate severe poverty 
 
Pogge’s theory of “severe poverty as a violation of negative duties” places particular 
emphasis on the “important ethical distinction” between the active causation of severe 
poverty and the failure to alleviate severe poverty for the establishment of human rights 
based claims. For example, under the “Minimalist Working Assumption” given in Box 1 
agents “must refrain from (actively) causing others’ human rights to be unfulfilled”. 
Furthermore, in considering the claim that we are responsible for any poverty deaths that we 
actively cause, but not for poverty deaths that we might have prevented, Pogge suggests that 
his own position accords with the libertarian position (2002a: 13). Nevertheless, Pogge’s 
underlying motivation is to transcend traditional debates and to construct a “middle position” 
between the libertarian emphasis on negative constraints (which he rejects on the grounds 
that people are entirely disconnected from deprivations that they do not directly bring about) 
and consequential approaches (which he rejects on the grounds that people are held to have 
obligations in relation to all deprivations, regardless of their causal relation to them). In 
making analytical space for this “middle position”, Pogge suggests that under particular 
empirical circumstances fundamental negative duties entail “derived duties to perform 
positive actions” - including an important category of “positive derived duties” to undertake 
actions aimed at compensating protection and reform. 
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2.3 The class of “positive derived duties” and Pogge’s “institutional 
understanding” of human rights  
 
The idea of a class of “derived positive duties” that are ultimately justified in terms of a 
fundamental principle of negative duty (rather than a fundamental principle of positive duty) 
is of great importance for debates about global poverty and human rights. In defending this 
idea, Pogge emphasises that the establishment of human rights based claims should be 
contingent on the attribution of causal responsibility - with “derived” positive obligations 
characterised as being “triggered” by non-compliance with a fundamental negative duty “not 
to actively cause harm”, rather than by fundamental positive duties of assistance and aid 
(with no “active causality” established). He contends that a class of “positive derived duties” 
can be characterised as a class of “remedial duties” that follow from a fundamental principle 
of negative duty (rather than a fundamental principle of positive duty), and that is consistent 
with the categories of positive duties accepted by libertarians (2005: 68). Hence:  
 
Box 1 
 
Proposition 1 (Pogge’s “Minimalist Working Assumption”) 
 
 “[H]uman rights impose only negative duties: Human rights require that agents not harm 
human being in certain specific ways but they do not require that agents help or protect 
anyone whose human rights are unfulfilled or threatened … [The assumption that] human 
rights impose only negative duties means that they require only omissions, not acts, and 
that they can be violated only by acts, not by omissions. Agents must refrain from 
(actively) causing others’ human rights to be unfulfilled” (Pogge, 2004a: 8). 
 
Propositions 2 and 3  (Pogge’s “Institutional Understanding of Human Rights”) 
 
“A human right to X gives rise to a moral claim against all others that they not harm you 
by cooperating, without compensating protection and reform efforts, in imposing upon 
you an institutional order in which you lack secure access to X as part of a foreseeable and 
avoidable human rights deficit” (2005: 67). 
 
“[A]ny institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably produces an excess of severe 
poverty and of mortality from poverty-related causes manifests a human rights violation 
on the part of those who participate in imposing this order” (2004a: 17). 
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“[A] very important source of positive obligations with regard to severe poverty in the 
modern world is our negative duty not to participate in the imposition of social institutions 
under which some lack secure access to the objects of their human rights”  (2004: 12).  
 
Pogge further contends that the “institutional understanding of human rights” encapsulated in 
Propositions 2 and 3 in Box 1 can be justified and elucidated within a negative theory of 
human rights that focuses on causal responsibility. More specifically, he suggests that the 
far-reaching position on human rights encapsulated in Propositions 2 and 3 can be achieved 
by accepting the libertarian normative assumption that human rights correlate with a 
fundamental principle of negative duty but not with a fundamental principle of positive duty, 
whilst challenging the libertarian factual claim that the existing global order is not causing 
poverty and harming the poor (2002, 12). This is achieved by invoking a socio-economic 
theory that suggests that global institutions, rules and processes can be shown to play a 
causal role in generating and perpetuating severe poverty.  
 
2.4 The relevance of socio-economic analysis of the causes of severe 
poverty  
 
Pogge’s theoretical framework highlights the important links between the justification of a 
class of fundamental or human rights and the socio-economic analysis of the causes of 
poverty, hunger and starvation. There are interesting parallels here with Berlin’s 
characterisation of freedom, which characterises negative freedom as the absence of coercion 
(where coercion implies “the deliberate interference of other human beings” in a personal 
sphere), whilst nevertheless recognising the important links between socio-economic 
analysis of the causes of poverty and the evaluation of human freedom.  
 
“[If] my poverty were a kind of disease … this inability would not naturally be 
described as a lack of freedom … [If] my inability to get a given thing is due to 
the fact that other human beings have made arrangements whereby I am, 
whereas others are not, prevented form having enough money with which to pay 
for it … I think myself a victim of coercion or slavery. [T]his use of the term 
depends on a particular social and economic theory about the causes of my 
poverty ... I begin to speak of being deprived of freedom (and not simply about 
poverty) only if I accept that theory …” (Berlin, 1969, 122-123). 
 
The debates about the interpretation of this paragraph have far-reaching implications, with 
narrower readings focussing on the notion of intentionality, and broader readings 
emphasising the ways in which the outcomes of social and economic processes (including 
market outcomes) might be characterised as “freedom limiting” conditions if their 
consequences, though unintended, are foreseeable or alterable. Similarly, the empirical 
reach of Pogge’s theory is critically linked to a background theory of socio-economic 
causation. For example, in developing a human rights critique of World Trade Organisation 
patent rules set out in “TRIPS” agreements, Pogge’s (2005) highlights the ways in which 
global economic and financial - the intellectual property rights agricultural subsidies, 
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dumping practices, restrictions on developing country market access, as well as the impact of 
structural adjustment, debt repayments and other economic and development policies - can 
be viewed as causing foreseeable and avoidable forms of severe poverty, morbidity and 
mortality, and therefore as a basis for establishing human rights based claims.  
 
 
3. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF POGGE’S POSITION  
  
How convincing is Pogge’s attempt to derive the far-reaching “institutional view” of human 
rights encapsulated in Propositions 2 and 3 in Box 1 from the “Minimalist Working 
Assumption” reflected in Proposition 1? This section highlights three limitations.   
 
3.1 Reliance on a controversial theory of socio-economic causation 
 
First, the empirical reach of Pogge’s normative framework is critically dependent on a 
controversial background theory of socio-economic causation. Pogge’s theory does not 
therefore necessarily cover all cases of severe global poverty, but rather all cases of” a 
certain kind of impoverishment that other agents are causally and morally responsible for” 
(2004: 4). As discussed in section 2.4, many of Pogge’s practical applications and 
illustrations are critically dependent on a background socio-economic theory that attributes 
casual responsibility for severe poverty on a massive scale to the “present global order”. 
However, the proposition that “features of the present global order cause massive severe 
poverty”, and that many or most cases of severe poverty will therefore fall within the reach 
of a negative theory of human rights, requires far-reaching theoretical and empirical 
investigation. In particular, the status of two categories of cases of severe poverty with 
respect to the establishment of human rights based claims requires further examination. 
These are:  
 
•   Cases of severe poverty included within the scope of Pogge’s negative theory of 
human rights, but only because they fall within the reach of a contested theory of 
causality.  
 
•   Cases of severe poverty excluded from the scope of Pogge’s theory, because they 
fall  
outside the reach of Pogge’s theory of causality.  
  
The first category of cases raises far-reaching and controversial theoretical and empirical 
questions concerning the evaluation of trends in global poverty and inequality; nature and 
scope of the underlying explanatory variables; the relative weight to be given to global 
institutions versus other variables such as domestic factors (including domestic economic 
policy, domestic political and institutional arrangements, cultural variables, climatic and 
environmental factors, economic endowments and inter-personal variations); the nature of 
the evidential thresholds of “causation” and the use of baseline comparisons; and the 
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differential impact, aims and functions of different international institutions (of, for example, 
WHO, UNDP and FAO, the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF)6. In relation to the second 
category of cases, even if global institutions can be shown to generate and perpetuate a large 
proportion of the world’s cases of severe and extreme poverty, other cases may nevertheless 
fall beyond the “causality” threshold and therefore outside the characterisation of severe 
poverty as a human rights issue. Examples might include, for example, cases of severe 
poverty attributable to interpersonal variations that cannot be attributed to socio-economic 
causes (e.g. inherited disability), to factors widely attributed to “bad luck” (e.g. harsh 
climatic conditions or having poor factor endowments such as being land-locked) and to 
other contextual variables (including natural disasters). Consider a poor country A in which 
cases of severe poverty are generated by a natural disaster the loss of livelihood and shelter 
caused by an environmentally induced Tsunami or an earthquake or flood, and where 
resource and feasibility constraints prevent an adequate domestic response. If cases of severe 
poverty of this type cannot be plausibly characterised as being caused by rich-country 
imposition of global institutions, then they apparently fall outside the reach of Pogge’s 
theory of causation and culpability, and therefore of his negative theory of human rights.  
 
3.2 Is the position set out in Pogge (2002a, 2004) accurately characterised 
as a “minimalist normative position”?  
 
Second, Pogge’s theory arguably goes beyond a “minimalist normative position” (which 
provides the stated basis of his theory of “severe poverty as a violation of negative duties”). 
As discussed in section 2.3, Pogge maintains that a sub-class of “positive derived duties” can 
be related to a fundamental principle of negative duty, rather than a fundamental principle of 
positive duty, on the grounds that “positive derived duties” fall within the reach of “causal” 
and “special” relationships and are triggered by non-compliance with the fundamental 
negative duty not to cause harm. However, this sub-class of “positive derived duties” seems 
to go beyond a “minimalist normative position” in important respects. In particular, Pogge’s 
assessments of the conditions under which severe poverty is actively caused relate to the 
notions of the foreseeability and avoidability of severe poverty - and as will be shown below, 
assessments of this type cannot be entirely independent of the formulation of evaluative 
judgements about the “adequacy” or “reasonableness” of actions taken to prevent and to 
alleviate severe poverty. In the absence of the development of subordinate evaluative criteria 
of this type, Pogge’s class of “derived positive duties” can be subjected to the critique of  
“open-endedness” and “implausibility” (c.r. section 4).   
 
                                            
6See, for example, Cruft (2005), Gilabert (2005) and Patten (2005), Risse (2005) and Barry 
(2005).  
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3.3 Does the distinction between “active causation” and “failure to 
alleviate” play a pivotal role in Pogge’s theory of global poverty and 
human rights? 
 
Third, many of Pogge’s practical illustrations and applications, based on the “institutional 
view” of human rights set out in Propositions 2 and 3 given in Box 1, seem to de-emphasise 
the distinction between actively causing severe poverty, and failing to prevent severe 
poverty, in the establishment of human rights based claims. Gilabert (2005: 542) notes that 
Pogge’s “positive derived duties” are only compatible with the minimalist normative 
premises of the libertarian rectification model if the objective of the compensations is strictly 
to remedy the harm caused for past conduct, rather than ensure that the objects of human 
rights are fully secure. In other words, human rights based claims under Pogge’s negative 
model might be expected to arise not from a human rights deficit per se, but rather should 
strictly relate to the element of non-fulfilment associated with harmful conduct in the form of 
“active causation”. However, many of Pogge’s applications and illustrations, based on the 
“institutional understanding” of human rights specified in Box 1, seem to adopt an evidential 
threshold regarding the establishment of human rights claims that seem to go beyond this 
position by de-emphasising the distinction between the “active causation” of severe poverty 
and the “failure to prevent” severe poverty (a distinction which is apparently critical to the 
formulation of the “minimalist normative assumption” on the basis of which Pogge 
proceeds).  For example, in a recent discussion of the human rights case for reform of 
intellectual property rights arrangements, Pogge argues that TRIPS agreements violate 
human rights because there exists an alternative institutional scheme that could have 
prevented the human rights denials that exist under the current institutional scheme. In 
making this argument, Pogge makes use of an evidential threshold regarding the 
establishment of human rights claims that seems to go significantly beyond a “minimalist 
normative premise” that critically turns on the ethical distinction between the “active 
causation” of harm and the “failure to take alleviate harm”. In particular, Pogge blurs the 
distinction between (1) harm “actively caused” by international economic agreements and 
(2) the failure of such arrangements to alleviate and prevent severe poverty in ways that are 
reasonably possible. The distinction between human rights claims arising from the “active 
causation” of severe poverty (involving “specific minimal constraints - more minimal in the 
case of human rights - on what harms persons may inflict upon others”) and human rights 
claims arising from the failure to take reasonable action to alleviate and prevent severe 
poverty is minimized - with the “failure to alleviate” (reduce / prevent) avoidable and 
foreseeable mortality and morbidity (by establishing an appropriate incentive structure that 
can ensure appropriate research, development and supply of essential medicines in poor 
countries) being viewed as establishing human rights based claims. The charge of  “re-
labelling” has been discussed in the secondary literature in this context (e.g. Patten, 2005: 
27)7. 
  
                                            
7For further discussions of Pogge's treatment of positive duty, see the various discussions in 
Pogge (forthcoming). 
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4. HOW PLAUSIBLE IS SEN’S TREATMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATION?  
 
Given these limitations, how plausible is the “capability approach” as an alternative 
theoretical framework for thinking about global poverty and human right? Sen’s treatment of 
positive obligation can be interpreted as building on Kant’s recognition of the role of 
“subordinate principles of judgement” in evaluating the fulfilment of “universal imperfect 
obligation”8. For example, Sen emphasises the distinction between a domain of “compulsory 
action” (involving “perfect obligations” to perform or not to perform specific actions) and a 
domain of “reasonable action” (involving “imperfect obligations” to take reasonable actions 
towards specified objectives or “ends”). He does not providing a complete / specific “list” of 
subordinate principles on the basis of which considerations of this type are to be balanced, or 
a full account of the procedures by which such principles might be developed. In this sense, 
Sen’s treatment of the concept of “reasonableness” - including his treatment of the basis on 
which actions might be evaluated as reasonable or unreasonable - is underdeveloped. 
Nevertheless, his discussion suggests the importance of the following considerations:  
 
•  The fundamental importance of human rights being protected and promoted 
•  Special concern with actions and causal responsibility for violations  
•  The nature and scope of pragmatic constraints  
•  The extent to which actions of the agent can make a difference (either singly or in  
conjunction with others) 
•  The alternative actions or courses of action that might have been performed  
•  Whether or not the outcome can be affected by collective action and institutions 
•  Commitments, values and special relationships. 
 
4.1 Can the fulfilment of “imperfect obligation” be impartially evaluated? 
The underlying theoretical debates 
 
This emphasis raises important underlying questions about the interpretation and 
contemporary application of the distinction between “universal perfect obligation” and 
“universal imperfect obligation” set out in Kant (1991 [1785]: 83-86) and 1996 [1797]. In 
particular, Sen’s treatment of the concept of “imperfect obligation” raises the underlying 
question of whether Kant’s position entails moral indifference to the actions or courses of 
action chosen by agents in relation to “imperfect obligation”, or whether there is scope for 
impartial evaluation of actions or courses of action (given commitment to particular 
“material maxims”). Kant’s mapping between the class of “imperfect duties” and “wide 
                                            
8“[T]he doctrine of right has to do only with narrow duties, whereas ethics has to do with 
wide duties. Hence the doctrine of right, which by its nature must determine duties strictly 
(precisely), has no more need of general directions (a method) as to how to proceed in 
judging … but ethics, because of the latitude it allows limits imperfect duties, unavoidably 
leads into questions that call upon judgement to decide how a maxim is to be applied in 
particular cases, and indeed in such a way that judgement provides another 
(subordinate) maxim …”  (Kant, 1996 [1797]: 168 emphasis added). 
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duties” suggests a “latitude for choice” in relation to actions and / or courses of action that 
agents should perform or not perform - providing recognition that, in the realm of “imperfect 
obligation” it is not possible to specify precisely “in what way one is to act and how much 
one is to do by the action” (1996 [1797]: 390; c.f. note 4). However, this “latitude for 
choice” is related to the presence of pragmatic considerations and judgements, and to the 
nature and scope of feasibility constraints’. It does not provide a “license for exceptions”, but 
rather a means of making obligations compatible where goal-fulfilments are not mutually co-
possible9. 
 
These elements of Kant’s framework have been interpreted in different ways. For example, 
Sullivan maintains that “[s]ince we are rarely in a position to know all the factors that may 
go into others’ decisions, we are also rarely, if ever, in a position to judge how well or badly 
they are fulfilling their positive obligations” (1996: xix). Wood suggests that Kant’s position 
implies moral indifference with the exception of cases where the actions or courses of action 
performed entail “general abandonment of the required end” (2002: 5). O’Neill questions 
whether Kant should be interpreted as implying indifference between any acts or courses of 
action of the required type, and raises the need for an account of practical judgement in the 
Kantian framework (2002: 336). Sen’s work takes these broader debates forward by building 
on Kant’s recognition of the need for the development of “subordinate ethical principles - 
especially “subordinate evaluative principles” relating to the notion of “reasonableness” - in 
the domain of “imperfect obligation”. His analysis highlights the possibility of a framework 
for the impartial evaluation of the fulfilment of “imperfect obligation” based on “subordinate 
evaluative principles” of this type.  
 
4.2 Can “imperfect obligations” establish counter-party human rights?  
 
Sen’s approach is important because it provides the basis of a radical departure from ethical 
theories that suggest that human rights do not extend to the domain of “imperfect 
obligation”. As discussed in section 1.4, many contemporary theories of human rights are 
based on this classic interpretation of the Kant’s theory of fundamental rights - with the class 
of “universal imperfect obligations” characterized as falling strictly outside the domain of a 
theory of fundamental rights, and outside the domain for which legislative enforcement is 
possible. For example, according to the classic interpretation, whilst Kant’s “obligation of 
beneficence” can be established as a “universal imperfect obligation” under Kant’s 
“universal law”, duties of beneficence fall within a sub-set of duties that are ethically binding 
but not legally binding, and that are not associated with claimable counter-party rights (Kant 
(1991 [1785]). 84-86; 1996 [1797]: 23, 31-32, 152-156, 168-9)10. In interpreting and 
                                            
9 Hence “a wide duty is not to be taken as permission to make exceptions … but only as 
permission to limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g. love of ones neighbour in general by 
love of ones parents) … (1996 1797]: 153).  
10Kant’s division of the “doctrine of duties in general” into the system of the Doctrine of 
Right (Ius) and the system of the Doctrine of Virtue (Ethica) is classically interpreted in 
terms of the distinction between a set of duties that are suitable for judicial enforcement and 
Pogge -vs- Sen on Global Poverty and Human Rights 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 3 (2), 2006,  
http://ethique-economique.org/ 
15 
developing the Kantian framework, O’Neill has argued that whereas “universal perfect 
obligations” (relating to the performance of specific actions) can be adequately reflected in a 
rights-based ethical framework, “universal imperfect obligations” (relating to the promotion 
of “maxims” / “ends of action” or “policies” or “goals”) will be “unallocated” and 
“neglected”. She views general positive obligations to relieve poverty, hunger and starvation 
as being located in the realm of virtue rather than justice, and as having “subordinate status 
in an ethical system in which the concept of rights is fundamental” (1996: 127-8).  
 
5. IMPLICATIONS OF SEN’S APPROACH FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A THEORY 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Sen provides an alternative point of departure. His emphasis on the development 
“subordinate principles of judgement” (particularly in relation to the notion of the 
“reasonableness” of actions or courses of action performed) provides a basis for viewing the 
positive obligation of reasonable assistance and aid as an allocated obligation (owed to all 
by all), and as being associated with counter-party human rights (rather than special or 
institutional rights) in terms of which and in terms of which systems of positive law and 
institutional arrangements should be justified and judged. His analysis suggests the 
importance of the development of a framework of ethical, social and legal norms for 
evaluating the fulfilment of imperfect obligations of this type, and points towards a theory of 
human rights in which practical action that fails to satisfy a “reasonableness” threshold can 
be characterised in terms of non-fulfilment or violation of human rights-based claims.  
  
5.1 Can “imperfect obligations” be meaningfully linked to a class of 
enforceable and justiciable counter-party rights? 
 
Sen’s conceptual framework can be interpreted as challenging interpretations and 
applications of the “Kantian Framework” that limit the domain of enforceable and justiciable 
individual rights to the domain of “universal perfect obligation”. In her analysis of Kant’s 
treatment of the “fundamental principles of right”, O’Neill cautions against a simplistic 
division of duties into “duties of right” and “duties of virtue”. She recognises that the 
                                                                                                                           
a set of duties that are cannot be enforced by external sanction and must by definition be 
performed voluntarily, on exclusively ethical grounds. Duties falling within the first sub-set 
are often characterised as (1) essentially “negative”, “limiting” and “non-conflicting” (or 
“co-possible”) 2) determined relatively strictly and precisely 3) suitable for enforcement by 
external sanction / judicial enforcement 4) associated with counterparty rights. Duties falling 
within the second sub-set are often characterised as 1)  “wide” rather than “narrow” (dealing 
with maxims / ends of action /goals rather than particular actions that should be performed); 
2) relatively “undetermined” 3) not suitable for enforcement by external sanction / judicial 
enforcement 4) not associated with counter-party rights. (See, for example, Kant (1991 
[1785]). 84-86; 1996 [1797]: 23, 31-32, 152-156, 168-9).  
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distinction between a “law of justice” prescribing actions, and a “law of virtue” prescribing 
maxims, is not precise - both embody general principles, and entails elements of 
indeterminacy that can only be resolved through judgement, agreement and 
institutionalisation, and that may require far-reaching judicial and administrative procedures. 
Nevertheless, she maintains that whereas “universal perfect obligations” are sufficiently 
determined to characterise a relationship between an agent and a recipient, and are associated 
with a class of counter-party liberty rights, “universal imperfect obligations” are 
characterized by their relative generality and relative indeterminacy. They are to be viewed 
primarily not in terms of a rights-based relationship between an agent and a recipient, but 
rather in terms of the character of agents (as “required virtues”), and are “unclaimable” in the 
sense that they require action, but do not specify for whom or to whom action is to be 
directed (e.g. 1996: 147-148; 2002a, 340)11.  
 
In contrast, Sen’s emphasis on the development of “subordinate principles of judgement” 
(particularly in relation to the notion of the “reasonableness” of actions or courses of action 
performed) provides a basis for viewing the positive obligation of reasonable assistance and 
aid as an allocated obligation (owed to all by all) that is de-limited (rather than “open-
ended”) and sufficiently determined to provide the basis of a claimable human rights-based 
relationship between agents and recipients. Furthermore, in his treatment of “imperfect 
obligation”, Sen has often emphasised that the idea of human rights can have an important 
role outside the legal domain, and that the justification and elucidation of the idea of human 
rights is not contingent on the degree of precision necessary for codification and judicial 
enforcement (e.g. 2000). Yet his conceptual framework provides a point of departure for 
extending the notion of “imperfect obligation” beyond the ethical domain, and for viewing 
positive obligations of reasonable assistance and aid as being enforceable and justiciable. 
This approach has particular “value added” for the development of a normative framework in 
which emerging international legal standards in the field of global poverty and human right 
can be meaningfully and coherently elucidated and understood.   
 
5.2 “Value added” of the “capability approach” for the conceptualisation 
of emerging international standards in the field of global poverty and 
human rights 
 
Theoretical debates about the legal status of international standards in the field of global 
poverty and human rights mirror the ethical debates about the status of “imperfect 
obligations” in important ways. The human right to a standard of living adequate for survival 
and development - including adequate nutrition, safe water and sanitation, shelter and 
housing, access to basic health and social services and education - is a basic human right that 
                                            
11O’Neill does not deny the possibility of universal rights to goods and services. However, 
she characterises universal rights of this type as sets of rights “whose counterpart obligations 
[are] distributed according to one or another institutional scheme, hence strictly speaking … 
special right[s]” (i.e. as “universally distributed” special or institutional rights) rather than as 
(pre-institutional) “fundamental” or “human rights” (1996: 132-3).  
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governments have individual and collective obligations to respect, protect and promote is 
reflected in legally binding international treaties such as the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)12. In the past, sceptics often argued that that 
the obligations of governments under Article 2 of the ICESCR relate to the “promotion of 
general goals” rather than to the performance and non-performance of specific actions, and 
cannot be adequately determined in a sufficiently concrete way for enforcement and 
justiciability. In contrast, emerging international standards in the field of global poverty and 
human rights point towards an alternative interpretation - with Article 2 being viewed as 
establishing binding positive obligations of assistance and aid - including positive 
obligations of assistance and aid on non-national governments. 
 
Sen’s conceptual framework has “value added” as a normative framework for the 
characterisation of Article 2 of the ICESCR as the legal (not just the ethical) embodiment of 
a “universal imperfect obligation” to promote a human rights-based goal. Whilst this positive 
obligation may be interpreted as giving rise to a particular responsibility not to violate 
internationally recognized human rights by actively causing global poverty (including 
through policies and programmes), it is not conditional on the “active causation” of severe 
poverty by the obligation holder. The analysis above suggests that this obligation can be 
meaningfully and coherently elucidated in terms of an underlying normative premise that 
recognizes that human rights give rise to positive claims of “reasonable assistance and aid” 
in relation to the defence and support of basic “capability rights” on the part of those in a 
position to help.  
 
Emerging case law in the field of global poverty and human rights further underlines the 
important role that an evidential framework based on “subordinate evaluative principles”, 
and judicial scrutiny of the notion of “reasonableness”, can play in making international 
obligations in the field of global poverty and human rights enforceable and judiciable. For 
example, the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court has established the 
justiciability of the socio-economic human rights recognised in Articles 26-29 of the South 
African Constitution whilst delimiting the nature and scope of the positive duties involved 
through the development of subordinate evaluative criteria based on the notion of 
“reasonableness”. It has reasoned that in cases where it is not possible to achieve minimum 
levels of economic and social rights for the entire population, compliance with the 
Constitution is to be evaluated in terms of the “reasonableness” of the actions that duty-
holders perform in the light of the results achieved. In several landmark cases, policies and 
programmes that fail to satisfy a “reasonableness” threshold have been found to be in 
violation of the Constitution13. 
                                            
12Available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm. 
13See The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa [Act 108 of 1996]; Government of 
the Republic of South Africa, the Premier of the Province of the Western Cape, Cape 
Metropolitan Council, Oostenberg Municipality v Grootboom and others, decided on 4 
October 2000, Case CCT 1100 Constitutional Court of South Africa (subsequently 
“Grootboom”); Minister of Health and others v Treatment Action Campaign and others, 
decided on 5 July 2002, Case CCT 8 / 02 (subsequently, TAC). Available electronically at 
www.concourt.gov.za. These cases are discussed in Vizard (forthcoming) Chapter 5. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Pogge’s argument that a class of “derived positive duties” can ultimately be justified in terms 
of a fundamental principle of negative duty that focuses on causal responsibility (rather than 
a fundamental principle of positive duty) is of great importance for debates about global 
poverty and human rights. However, Pogge’s attempt to defend this idea within a 
“minimalist normative framework” raises certain inconsistencies and tensions. In moving 
from the “Minimalist Working Assumption” encapsulated in proposition 1 in Box 1 to the 
“institutional understanding of human rights” encapsulated in Propositions 2 and 3, Pogge 
de-emphasises the importance of the distinction between actively inflicting severe poverty, 
and failing to prevent severe poverty, in the establishment of human rights based claims. In 
addition, Pogge’s class of “derived positive duties” is critically dependent on the formulation 
of subordinate evaluative judgements about the “adequacy” (or “reasonableness”) of actions 
taken to prevent and alleviate severe poverty.  
 
Sen’s treatment of the “capability approach” and human rights emphasises the explicit 
introduction, development and justification of “subordinate evaluative criteria” of this type. 
The analysis in this Paper suggests that this approach provides a basis for moving beyond a 
“minimalist normative position” whilst avoiding Pogge’s charge of “implausibility”. Sen’s 
emphasis on the development of “subordinate principles of judgement” (including 
subordinate principles relating to the notion of “reasonableness”) has been shown to provide 
a basis for delimiting positive obligations of assistance and aid, and for avoiding the charge 
of “open-endedness” associated with PIT-1. The Paper has explored the “value-added” of 
this approach in extending a theory of human rights to the domain of “imperfect obligation”, 
and for establishing cross-disciplinary links with international human rights law.  
 
Whilst the current Paper has focussed on the subject of global poverty and human rights, 
these arguments have broader relevance for the assessment of Pogge’s critique of the 
“capability approach” as a theory of social justice. In particular, Sen’s treatment of the 
“subordinate principles of judgement” (including “subordinate principles of judgement” 
relating to the notion of “reasonableness”) might be successfully invoked as a basis for the 
critical assessment of PIT-2. 
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